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 Abstract 
Renewable energy support mechanisms affect the attractiveness of projects by 
influencing uncertainties in revenues or expenditures and ultimately result in a 
change in the financing costs. The influence of feed-in tariffs on financing costs 
was investigated. 26 wind onshore investors were surveyed in a conjoint analy-
sis and the results were used in a cash flow model to quantify the impact. The 
introduction of premium models under a fixed remuneration tariff scheme seems 
to increase the financing costs considerably. 
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1  Introduction and objective of the study 
To combat climate change and cope with the projected depletion of fossil fuels, 
many countries have decided to promote the use of renewable energy (RE) 
sources such as solar, wind, or hydropower. 
However, renewable power plants like wind turbines are often capital-intensive 
investments with payback periods in excess of ten years and varying yields. 
Support mechanisms can increase the attractiveness of such projects via two 
avenues: firstly, by increasing the level of support and secondly, by reducing the 
riskiness of the project where risk is considered to be the variability of returns. 
Many researchers have addressed the issue of financial risks in the context of 
specific types of support mechanisms. But so far, the discussion on the influ-
ence of support mechanisms has been restricted to qualitative issues.  
This paper undertakes a different approach and attempts to elaborate the im-
pact in a quantitative manner by assessing the impact of feed-in tariffs or pre-
miums on the financing costs of German wind power investors via a stated 
preference approach. Investors are asked to choose between two RE projects 
which differ by one characteristic. The obtained values express the willingness 
to accept risks influenced by policy elements. Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2010) 
were the first to apply such a stated preference approach to assess preferences 
of investors in the field of RE by facing photovoltaic (PV) investors with several 
policy risks. Based on their findings, PV investors regard the duration of the 
administrative process as the most important policy element for their investment 
decision, followed by the level of the feed-in tariff and the existence of a cap. 
In this study, the focus is on three policy designs and their influence on financ-
ing costs. Their impact on financing cost is investigated by, firstly, conducting a 
survey and conjoint analysis among German wind onshore investors. Finally, a 
cash flow model is set up, where the results of the conjoint analysis are used to 
compute the impact on financing costs in terms of percentage points. 
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2  Renewable energy policies, investment risks and 
financing costs 
2.1 Renewable  energy  policies 
In general, the promotion of renewable energy relies on two avenues: the price 
or the quantity approach. Roughly speaking, under a price approach, the price 
for renewable energy is determined by the government and the produced quan-
tity of energy by the market. In a perfect market, equilibrium occurs at the point 
at which the price equals the marginal costs of production. An example for this 
approach is the fixed feed-in tariff currently in place in Germany.  
The quantity approach focuses on a target quantity set by an authority, e.g. 
government. The price is determined by the market and equals the marginal 
costs of supplying the specified quantity. One example is the quota obligation 
system in combination with tradable green certificates as applied in Britain, 
where minimum shares of renewable energy are imposed on energy suppliers. 
Quota obligations combined with tradable green certificates are said to be more 
market-based than feed-in tariffs and to lead to lower costs for renewable power 
(Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006). However, a comparison between the UK and 
Germany revealed that in fact the opposite is true: The German feed-in tariff 
actually lead to cheaper prices paid per wind energy delivered and, moreover, 
although less favourable wind conditions prevail, more capacity has been in-
stalled in Germany than in the UK (Butler and Neuhoff 2008). 
A further example for a quantity obligation is a tendering system. Investors 
submit bids specifying the selling price for power at a specified plant location. 
The offer with the lowest price is awarded a contract – a so-called “Power Pur-
chasing Agreement (PPA)” for 15-20 years. Currently, Denmark applies a ten-
dering system for offshore wind parks. 
In theory, these two approaches are comparable methods for achieving diffu-
sion targets (Menanteau, Finon et al. 2003). But in reality they diverge with re-
spect to the achievement of objectives and in terms of attractiveness for inves-
tors. To better understand the policies’ impact on financing costs, we outline the 
features of the feed-in system in the following section. The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
– the case of wind power in Germany  3 
2.1.1  Fixed-price feed-in tariffs 
The principle of feed-in tariff (FIT) policies is to provide a guaranteed price per 
MWh for RE investors over a long period of time, usually 20 years. If the remu-
neration is independent of market prices, the policy is called a fixed-price FIT. 
The fixed-price option is the most commonly employed FIT policy (Klein, Held et 
al. 2008). 
Based on technology costs, the level of remuneration is specified according to 
the type of technology: e.g. currently, offshore wind farms in Germany receive € 
150 per MWh in the initial phase, while onshore wind receives only € 91 per 
MWh. In Germany, for new power plants, the level of remuneration decreases 
every year based on a pre-determined formula (Langniß, Diekmann et al. 2009), 
e.g. for onshore wind farms by 1% every year (BMU 2009). An alternative de-
sign option is front-end loading, where higher payments are offered in the first 
few years of the investment than in later years. In Germany, fixed FIT policies 
encompass a purchase guarantee such that the Distribution Network Operators 
(DNO) are not only obliged to connect renewable power plants to the transmis-
sion grid, but also have to purchase the produced power at fixed tariffs 
(Ragwitz, Held et al. 2007). 
2.1.2 Feed-in  premiums   
In contrast, under a feed-in premium system (FIP), electricity generators sell 
their power on the spot market under market price conditions. In addition, the 
generator receives a premium payment on top of the electricity price for each 
MWh sold. Such market-dependent FIT policies are generally known as pre-
mium price models because a premium is added to the market price of electric-
ity. There are several premium schemes in use, e.g. a fixed or a variable pre-
mium scheme with a cap and floor. 
Under a fixed premium scheme the power generator sells the power directly on 
the spot market and receives an additional premium on top of the obtained spot 
market price for electricity. The combination of a constant premium and a vari-
able market price means the power generator’s income varies but remuneration 
is not entirely fixed by an institution. 
To limit the price range, some countries have introduced variable FIP with caps 
and floors. In such models, the FIP is constant within a certain range, de-  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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creases if the market price exceeds a certain upper range, and vice versa if it 
falls below a lower range. For market prices above the cap, the premium is zero 
(cap) and the operator receives only the market price. For market prices under 
the lower range, the premium increases gradually in line with decreasing prices 
such that, in total, a kind of minimum remuneration is assured (floor). The vari-
able premium is determined on an hourly basis.  
A slight deviation of the variable FIP is currently being implemented in the 
Netherlands. There, the premium depends on the technology base price (re-
flecting generation costs) minus the wholesale price for electricity (price adjust-
ment) (Rathmann et al. 2009). This model depends on the market price, but 
from an investor’s perspective, the remuneration level is stable so that it can be 
classified within the market-independent policies (Couture and Gagnon 2010). 
The variable premium model has two advantages: the floor safeguards the in-
vestor against a price decline and pending losses, while the cap prevents wind-
fall profits for generators at the expense of the public/consumers (Ragwitz, Held 
et al. 2007). 
2.2  Financing costs and risks 
2.2.1  Average cost of capital 
Wind power plants are capital-intensive investments with capital expenditures 
ranging from € 2.0 million to € 2.7 million for a 2 MW wind turbine (Krohn, 
Morthorst et al. 2009). A principal precondition for investments in such projects 
is a minimum rate of return that is defined as “the expected rate of return de-
manded by investors in common stocks or other securities subject to the same 
risks as the project” (Brealey, Myers et al. 2008). This definition addresses sev-
eral aspects of the expected rate of return. First, it reflects the principle of op-
portunity costs, meaning that the expected return of the project must be suffi-
ciently high in order to compensate investors for foregone gains from other pro-
jects. Further, the expected rate of return reflects the result of a market mecha-
nism, the equilibrium between the demand and supply of investments. In addi-
tion, the expected returns are based on future cash flows weighted by probabili-
ties (of occurrence) that in turn reflect uncertain outcomes, hence, risks. For an 
investor, the expected return on capital for putting money at risk must be 
greater than the opportunity cost of capital. Subsequently, it can be said that the The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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expected return and hence the financing cost is strongly determined by the per-
ceived risks.  
Overall, renewable energy projects are typically financed by debt and equity 
with a capital structure of 70-75% of debt and 25-30% of equity (EWEA 2009). 
Debt investors like banks provide loans, while equity investors provide capital 
from internal and/or external sources like public or private markets. Equity in-
vestors are prepared to make high-risk investments if high returns can be ex-
pected. When analysing a project, they focus on expected investment returns 
(Wiser and Pickle 1998). In contrast, debt investors tend to be more reluctant to 
take risks. The debt represents a fixed obligation and is senior to other types of 
capital. The loan contract offers specified interest payments and provides col-
laterals to cover a possible credit default. Lenders will reject a loan if a certain 
level of risk default is exceeded. In contrast to equity investors, they analyse the 
project under a worst-case scenario (Wiser and Pickle 1997). Debt investors 
provide capital under low risk conditions while equity investors bear the main 
investment risks and, hence, require a significantly higher expected rate of re-
turn than lenders. 
Financing costs can be calculated by taking the weighted average of the cost of 
debt and the cost of equity. Also taking into account that interest payments are 
tax-deductable, the following formula (Equation 1) applies for the weighted av-
erage cost of capital:  
Equation 1:            1     
 
      
 
  
Here D and E are market values of debt and equity. V stands for the sum of 
both. rD and rE are the cost of debt and the cost of equity, respectively. Tc is the 
marginal corporate tax rate. 
2.2.2  Specific investment risks for RE 
Risks for RE investments encompass among others uncertainty about the mar-
ket price, the quantity sold and the balancing of power (Mitchell, Bauknecht et 
al. 2006). As discussed in the previous section, the remuneration level of feed-
in tariffs guarantees a fixed payment per produced unit of power and hence 
completely compensates the price risk. Under premium models, the received 
price consists of a fixed or variable premium plus the spot market price. Hence, 
price risk is more (variable premium) or less (fixed premium) limited but not fully   The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
6  – the case of wind power in Germany 
compensated by the feed-in premium. Usually, the spot market prices for elec-
tricity vary with respect to supply and demand. Prices are low or even negative 
at night and high during the day (Streckiene, Martinaitis et al. 2009). On aver-
age, approx. € 4 € per MWh were paid in 2010 (EEX 2011). Besides hourly or 
daily fluctuations, prices also change over time depending on primary energy 
prices and other costs, and the overall demand and supply of electricity. Figure 
1 shows the average annual spot market prices for Germany. 
In the case of wind power, supply is erratic and hence not adaptable to prices. 
Therefore, price changes directly translate into revenue changes. Furthermore, 
fluctuations in wind occur on an hourly, daily, monthly and even yearly basis. So 
the quantity risk transfers into a revenue stream that varies even from year to 
year. In contrast to traditional power plants, wind turbines face no price or sup-
ply risks for fuels but they obviously depend strongly on wind yield.  
Figure 1:   Average annual spot market prices in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Streckiene et al. (2009) and EEX (2011) 
Figure 2 shows the annual wind yield expressed as a percentage of the long-
term mean between 2001 and 2010 in Germany. In 2010, for example, only 
74% of the long term average wind yield was reached, resulting in unexpectedly 
low revenues for wind power generators. 
The feed-in support system in Germany guarantees purchases, hence, the 
market risk with respect to the quantity sold is completely mitigated for renew-
able electricity. Further, balancing risks are reduced since RE power generators 
are not obliged to supply a certain load profile. They can produce energy re-
gardless of the current demand (Mitchell, Bauknecht et al. 2006). The transmis-
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from renewable energy sources can be fed into the transmission grid. However, 
events like unexpected low demand or potential grid instability forces transmis-
sion grid operators to regulate or even shut down renewable energy power 
plants by remote control. Germany has implemented a hardship scheme to 
eliminate this risk. Under such a scheme, grid operators must compensate the 
losses of affected plants. The compensation payment is either settled by an 
agreement between the grid and the plant operator, or is based on the forgone 
remuneration minus saved disbursements (BMU 2007). 
Figure 2:   Annual wind yield in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on BWE (2010) 
It is assumed that the reduction or mitigation of market and balancing risks by 
policy schemes translates into lower average capital costs since the expected 
returns on investments become fairly certain returns. This should lead to de-

























Year  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
8  – the case of wind power in Germany 
3 Methodological  approach 
The trade-off between risks and returns for RE investors is investigated using a 
stated preference approach. A conjoint analysis is conducted to study the influ-
ence of selected policy elements on the investment decision. It is important to 
provide a realistic and manageable decision situation to the interviewed inves-
tor. Since financing costs depend on many factors that cannot be handled ap-
propriately or simultaneously in such a task, respondents would be overstrained 
by stating the influence of policy elements on financing variables directly. To 
avoid this problem, an additional step is interposed. 
  The first step investigates the trade-off between selected RE policy elements 
and a common measure of spot quality. This is done by applying a conjoint 
analysis. A linear-additive preference model is set up to map the answers. 
  The second step uses the results of the conjoint analysis in order to calculate 
the impact of the selected elements on financial costs by applying a tradi-
tional financial cash flow model. 
3.1 Research  design 
3.1.1  Method of analysis 
Stated preference approaches try to elicit the preferences of individuals directly 
by asking them to make a choice between two hypothetical options and then 
evaluating the given answers. Direct approaches can investigate new situations 
which are outside the current set of experiences or outside the data set avail-
able (Adamowicz, Louviere et al. 1994).  
Conjoint analysis is a stated preference method and was developed by Luce 
and Turkey (1964). It was introduced into marketing literature at the beginning 
of the 1970s and has developed into a method that receives a lot of attention in 
this field. It mimics a purchase decision where the buyer is faced with products 
each consisting of different levels of product attributes like brand, price, colour 
or performance. The respondent is faced with various predetermined products, 
the so-called stimuli, and is asked to rank or rate them or to choose the pre-
ferred one. The method derives its name from the fact that the respondent has 
to consider the attributes jointly. By analysing the given answers, it is possible 
to find out what the preferences are. It is considered a decompositional ap-
proach (Alriksson and Öberg 2008). The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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Most of the conducted studies are marketing-oriented, and are commonly used 
for new product design, product optimization, price setting or market segmenta-
tion. A few studies have used conjoint analysis to study the strategic decisions 
of managers rather than the purchasing decisions of consumers. They assumed 
that the manager’s investment decision is similar to the consumer’s purchasing 
decision and that the manager also takes several attributes into consideration in 
his decision. For example, DeSarbo et al. (1987) tried to quantify the impor-
tance of pre-designed attributes for managers’ investment decisions by inter-
viewing 26 venture capital investors. In the field of RE investments, Lüthi and 
Wüstenhagen (2010) surveyed 63 European solar photovoltaic investors. By 
confronting them with different policy risks like tariff duration, existence of a cap, 
duration of the administrative process, policy stability and additionally with dif-
ferent remuneration levels, they were able to compute more than just the rela-
tive importance of the attributes. Furthermore, they could calculate the required 
compensation for certain kinds and levels of risk in terms of a monetary value, 
namely an increase of the remuneration level. 
However, stated preference approaches have limitations; one of their main 
problems is the hypothetical bias. Respondents are asked to supply answers to 
situations or options they do not face in reality (Portney 1994). In an attempt to 
reduce this drawback in this study, the investor was asked to compare two in-
vestment projects and indicate how much he prefers one to the other. Thus, the 
answers were not statements about the probability of investing but about pref-
erences. 
Similar to the approach taken by Lüthi and Wüstenhagen, we conducted a con-
joint analysis among wind power investors to investigate their preferences re-
garding selected policy elements. Several attributes and levels were chosen 
and various combinations of them, the so-called stimuli, were presented to the 
investor. 
3.1.2 Selection  of  attributes and levels 
Among the many different factors influencing the preference of a renewable en-
ergy investor for an investment opportunity, only a few can be addressed by a 
support scheme. The most important factor is uncertainty about the received 
remuneration. This price risk is addressed by remuneration tariffs. One can dis-
tinguish between three possible feed-in models. In the fixed remuneration 
model, the investor does not face a price risk at all since he receives a fixed   The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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tariff per generated unit of power. In a premium model, the investor receives the 
spot market price, which varies, plus a fixed premium. He therefore faces a cer-
tain price risk. The last model, the variable premium model, shifts some risk to 
the investor, but limits this risk through setting fixed caps and floors.  
The expected average remuneration level of the three different hypothetical in-
vestment opportunities had to be the same in all cases, since only the inherent 
price risk should influence the investor’s decision. The level was set at € 95 per 
MWh. This corresponds roughly to the remuneration paid in Germany in 2011. 
In the premium model, the premium is fixed. The spot market price for electricity 
has been € 39 on average since 2009 so the premium would have to be set at 
€ 56 in order to add up to the total average remuneration of € 95. Due to the 
expected electricity price rises, the premium is said to be adjusted annually. In 
the variable premium model, the cap was set at € 115 and the floor at € 75. This 
price range of € 40 was proposed by Langniss et al. (2009).  
The second attribute is a measure of profitability. It is incorporated to investigate 
the risk-return trade-off of investments in wind power. The levels are set at 
1600, 1800 and 2000 full load hours (FLH), a common measure for expected 
returns. 
The third attribute is a shut-down compensation. Since 2009, operators in Ger-
many have been compensated under a hardship scheme. If the grid operator 
decides to shut down the wind turbine because the grid threatens to collapse, 
the wind power operator receives compensation for losses incurred. Without 
such a shut-down compensation mechanism, the investor would face the risk of 
not being able to operate the wind turbine at a certain time. 
The fourth attribute is quantity balancing. Fluctuations in wind yield pose a risk 
to the investor because he cannot definitely know how much power the wind 
turbine will produce in a particular year. The resulting varying revenue could 
potentially be balanced by adjusting remuneration retroactively. “Quantity bal-
ancing” therefore means that the operator receives additional remuneration 
when wind yield was below the long-term average and has to pay back a por-
tion of the remuneration if it was above average. 
To summarise, two attributes (A and B) with three levels and two attributes (C 
and D) with two levels are included in the analysis. Table 1 shows the attributes 
and levels with the corresponding numbers. The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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Table 1:   Attributes and levels 
 
Source: Own illustration 
3.1.3 Questionnaire  design 
The main part of the questionnaire consisted of the presentation of several 
stimuli comprising various combinations of the attribute levels. To present the 
investor with a realistic investment opportunity, all four attributes were included 
in the stimuli. Instead of presenting all 36 possible combinations of investment 
opportunities, a fractional factorial design of 11 stimuli was generated using the 
statistic programme SPSS (Addelman 1962). Investors were confronted with 
two investment opportunities at the same time because it is thought they can 
make finer distinctions when comparing two stimuli side-by-side than when they 
have to evaluate one investment option on its own. The second stimuli were 
generated by “shifting”. The codes of the first stimuli (left investment option) 
were taken and 1 added  to obtain the second stimuli (right investment option) 
(Chrzan and Orme 2000).1 Table 2 shows the eleven pairs of stimuli presented 
to the investors.  
The investors were asked to state which investment they would prefer. A Likert-
scale with seven options was presented under the two investment options, 
ranging from “strongly prefer left” to “Strongly prefer right”. The option in the 
middle of the scale meant “indifferent”. Investors marked their preference for 
one of the options. 
                                            
1   In cases of only two levels, 0 was shifted to 1 and 1 was shifted to 0. In cases of three le-
vels, 1 was shifted to 2, 2 to 3 and 3 to 1 
Attribute Level #
A. Feed‐In Tariff Fixed Remuneration 1
Variable Premium with Cap and Floor 2
Premium Model 3
B. Full Load Hours 1600 FLHs 1
1800 FLHs 2
2000 FLHs 3
C. Shut‐Down Compensation No Shut‐Down Compensation 0
Shut‐Down Compensation 1
D. Quantity Balancing No Quantity Balancing 0
Quantity Balancing 1  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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In addition to the conjoint tasks, five questions were asked about the back-
ground of the company and the investor.  
Table 2:   Presented stimuli 
 
Source: Own illustration 
3.2  Conjoint analysis (CJA) 
In order to investigate the risk-return trade-off made by investors, an appropri-
ate utility model has to be set up. Starting from microeconomic consumption 
theory, Lancaster (1966) argued that the utility from a good comes not from the 
consumption of the good itself, but from the characteristics of that good. Each 
good has several characteristics and shares some of them with other goods. 
The value of a good then stems from the values of the characteristics. 
According to random utility theory, not all the determinants of utility derived by 
individuals can be observed by researchers. Besides the observable section 
there is a stochastic section, which is not observable (Louviere, Hensher et al. 
2000). Furthermore, a compensatory model has to be assumed.  
In this approach, the overall utility of one good is constructed by simply adding 
the utilities of the characteristics involved. The characteristics of a good such as 
price, colour, or brand are called attributes and the parameter value of an attrib-
ute reflects the level ($10, $12 or $14 for the attribute ‘price’) in the CJA. The 
utilities of attributes are called “part-worths”. A “low” level of one attribute can 
thus be compensated by a “high” level of another attribute.  
Conjoint










1 0 3210 1301
1 1 2200 3311
Left investment option Right investment optionThe impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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Instead of analysing consumption behaviour, this study investigates the prefer-
ences of investors. It is therefore assumed that, similar to a purchase decision, 
the investor takes all the characteristics (attributes) of the investment project 
into consideration and is able to state his preference.  
In this analysis three attributes capture risk (price and performance risk) and 
one attribute reflects profitability aspects. The shut-down compensation is either 
paid or not, likewise some options receive quantity balancing and others not. A 
linear vector model is appropriate for these attributes with just two levels each. 
The three levels of the attribute full load hours can also be represented with the 
vector model by reducing it to just two levels. Since the difference between 
1600 and 1800 FLHs is exactly the same as the difference between 1800 and 
2000 FLHs, it is assumed that the difference in utility (linear) is also the same. 
Therefore, the levels of FLH have been changed into a two level attribute by 
using only “additional 200 FLH” and “no additional FLH”.  
The attribute, feed-in tariff, is a categorical attribute, so the vector model is not 
applicable here. But it is possible to apply the vector model by using two dummy 
variables. The part-worth feed-in tariff is adapted by creating two auxiliary at-
tributes for the feed-in attribute. This is done by splitting the feed-in attribute into 
two two-level attributes: “Variable Premium” and “Premium (levels: “yes” and 
“no”). 
Including all levels of an attribute in the model would yield perfect correlation 
between the independent variables. This is called the “dummy variable trap”. To 
avoid it, the first level of each attribute is dropped (Greene 2008). Hence, the 
utility V for an investor of project p can be expressed (Equation 2) as: 
Equation 2: 
                 .    .          .                     .          .       , 
where    is the unobservable error term of the model with E[  ]=0. 
The coefficients α1, α2, α3 α4 and α5 are interpreted as the part-worths to the 
investor. The coefficient α3 is the part-worth of having additional 200 FLHs. The 
other coefficients indicate the contribution or value of having a variable premium 
model, a premium model, shut-down compensation and quantity balancing of-
fered in the investment project instead of the attributes of the base project which 
are fixed remuneration, 1600 FLHs, no shut-down compensation and no quan-  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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tity balancing. The coding of all eleven stimuli is depicted in the two left columns 
of Table 3.  
Table 3:   Coding of stimuli 
 
Source: own illustration 
For the interview, the investor was asked to compare two projects and state his 
preference on a Likert-scale with seven response options. Depending on the 
levels of the attributes, one of the two investment options displayed is supposed 
to be preferred by the interviewed investor. The range was limited to seven gra-
dations to ensure that the investor can make fine discriminations (Meyer and 
Booker 1991). 
The answer can be interpreted as the change in utility moving from the right 
project to the left project. Subtracting the utility of the right project from the utility 
of the left project leads to Equation 3: 
Equation 3 
∆           .    .            .                         .            .   
        
The parameter α0 of the base investment project disappears, since there is no 
difference in utility between the two projects if all attributes have the same level 
(Miguel, Ryan et al. 2000). This is also depicted in Table 3 (right column), where 
the codes of the right-hand side investment option are subtracted from the left-
hand side option in order to obtain the coding of the independent variables as 
shown in Equation 3 (Steiner 2007). The model only measures main effects. 
Interaction terms are not included; they are assumed to be zero. 
Conjoint
#V .  Prem. Prem. FLH Comp. Bal. V. Prem. Prem. FLH Comp. Bal.
1 0 0100 1 0211‐10 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
2 0 1001 0 0110 0 1 ‐1 ‐11
3 0 0210 1 0001‐10 2 1 ‐1
4 1 0201 0 1010 1 ‐12 ‐11
5 0 0011 1 0100‐10 ‐11 1
6 0 1111 0 0200 0 1 ‐11 1
7 0 1210 0 0001 0 121‐1
8 1 0111 0 1200 1 ‐1 ‐11 1
9 1 0010 0 1101 1 ‐1 ‐11‐1
1 0 0 1110 0 0201 0 1 ‐11‐1
1 1 1 0100 0 1211 1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Left investment option Right investment option Independent Variables
V. Prem. Bal. Comp. FLH Prem.The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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A further assumption has to be made regarding the dependent variable. It is 
assumed that the distances between the seven answers (at the Likert-scale) are 
the same: The dependent variable is scaled at intervals. By doing so, it is pos-
sible to apply a metric approach. Here, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
is applied to estimate equation 1. The dependent variable is coded with num-
bers ranging from +3 indicating ‘Strongly Prefer Left’ to -3 indicating ‘Strongly 
Prefer Right’. 
The coefficients resulting from the regression are used to compute the rate of 
substitution. Let Δ Variablei and Δ Variablej be the changes in Variable i and in 
Variable j. By assumption, the change in utility (ΔV) must be zero. Rearranging 
the equation (Equation 4) shows an expression known as the marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) between the variables i and j (Varian 1992). Since full load 
hours is one of the attributes, its coefficient can be used as the numeraire. This 
implies that the MRS can be interpreted as average willingness-to-accept 
(WTA). These values are expressed in units of profitability, namely FLHs. The 
willingness to accept level 1 instead of having level 0 (base investment option) 
is calculated with the following formula (Equation 4): 
Equation 4: 
  
           
 ∆             
  
           
∆            0  
           
            
   
  
            
  




        
∆                     
  
  
 ∆                     
The ratio of the coefficients is multiplied by 200 because the difference between 
two levels of the attribute full load hours is 200 FLHs. 
If the formula leads to a negative result, it is multiplied by (-1) and is then called 
“willingness-to-pay (WTP)”. The WTP for shut-down compensation and quantity 
balancing is calculated this way. 
So far, conjoint analysis asks investors to rate several hypothetical investment 
projects. Based on the given answers, the contribution of each project’s attrib-
ute to the overall preference level can be explored. By using a metric approach, 
it is even possible to measure the trade-off between risk and return. The last   The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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step, computing the impact on financing costs, is undertaken with the help of a 
traditional cash flow model. 
3.3  Cash flow model 
The cash flow model is a basic tool for investors to analyse the profitability of a 
project in order to facilitate the investment decision. The WTA and WTP values 
obtained via the conjoint analysis are inserted in order to measure the impact of 
RE policy elements on financing costs. 
The cash flow model assesses the internal rate of return (IRR) of a fictional 2 
MW onshore wind power project with a 20-year investment life (Wiser 1997) 
and tracks yearly revenues from selling power and expenses for maintenance 
and taxes. Krohn et al. (2009) describe a typical 2 MW wind turbine installed in 
Europe. In the scenario, costs are adopted from Krohn and therefore assumed 
to add up to € 2.5 million. 
During the wind turbine’s lifetime the fictionally generated power is fed into the 
power grid and generates revenue depending on power quantity and price. The 
calculation based on 1600 FLHs (base level of the conjoint analysis) results in 
3200 MWh produced power per year. The price for wind power is € 95 per MWh 
in accordance with the conjoint questionnaire and the feed-in tariff for onshore 
wind in Germany in 2011. Revenues are therefore € 304,000 per year. The 
price of wind power is assumed to be the same over the whole lifetime since 
even under the premium models, the total remuneration is assumed to add up 
on average to € 95 per MWh. 
O&M costs are assumed to be € 14.5 per MWh over the whole lifetime, so that 
O&M expenses are € 46,400 per year. In Germany, operators are obliged to 
depreciate wind turbines linearly over 16 years, which equals € 156,250 per 
year in the present case. The pre-tax profit can now be calculated by subtract-
ing depreciation and O&M costs from revenues. A tax burden of 37.5% is as-
sumed (Franke and Hax 2009). Changes in working capital are ignored as are 
debt payments. 
Depreciation is not a real cash flow and has to be added to profit-after-tax to 
calculate the free cash flow (FCF) for every period t. The final calculation is de-
picted in Equation 5 The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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Equation 5: 
      FLHs   rated power    1   tax rate  remuneration level   O&M costs  
              tax rate   depreciation 
                        € 100.625           € 58593.75  for      1,…,16
 0  for      17,…,20
0          
 
 
Having done this, it is possible to then compute the internal rate of return (IRR) 
using the following formula: 
Equation 6:  ∑
               
                  0  
where I0 is the initial investment of € 2.5 million. 
The internal rate of return is the discount rate at which the net present value is 
zero and measures the profitability of a project. In the present case with 1600 
FLHs, the IRR is 5.68%. Table 4 shows the cash flow model. 
Table 4:   Cash flow model 
 
Source: Own calculation 
t [years] 0 1 - 16 17 - 20
Produced Power (MWh) 3,200 3,200
Remuneration per MWh € 95 € 95
Sales € 304,000 € 304,000
Investment Costs -€ 2,500,000
O&M Costs € 46,400 € 46,400
Linear Depreciation € 156,250
Pre‐tax profit € 101,350 € 257,600
Taxes at 37,5% € 38,006 € 96,600
Profit‐after‐tax € 63,344 € 161,000
Free Cash Flow -€ 2,500,000 € 219,594 € 161,000
IRR 5.68%  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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The IRR can be viewed in this case as a function of FLHs and the amount of 
the initial investment I0  (            ,   ).  It depends positively on FLHs 
meaning that an increase in full load hours leads to an increase in IRR. 
The obtained WTA values from the conjoint analysis can be added to 1600 
FLHs. The new figure represents the total full load hours the investor requires 
the investment project to offer in order to have the same utility as the other pro-
ject. By increasing FLHs, the IRR increases as well. This increase is seen as 
the impact of financing costs resulting from changes in the support mechanism.  
The weighted average cost of capital is calculated based on Equation 1 by us-
ing the IRR as cost of debt and equity. The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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4  Results of conjoint and cash-flow analysis 
4.1 Sample  and  data 
Participants in the survey were onshore wind investors. Of particular interest 
were investors who had made or were planning to make investments in coun-
tries other than Germany. These investors were regarded as being better suited 
to evaluating the risks stemming from different feed-in tariffs. To limit the tar-
geted selection, only investors from Germany were asked to participate. 
Beginning in September 2010 relevant companies were contacted by phone 
and invited to participate in the online survey. The link to the survey was sent by 
email immediately after the phone-call and a reminder was sent after one week. 
46 respondents logged on to the survey website and 22 completed the ques-
tionnaire. The dropouts may have been the result of the length of the question-
naire, which took about 15 minutes to complete. Another reason could have 
been the relatively difficult investment decision task. Unfortunately two of the 
respondents did not actually state their preferences; they marked themselves as 
being indifferent in all conjoint tasks. Their answers were deleted from the data 
set. 
Besides the online survey, some investors were asked to participate directly on-
site. Six respondents agreed to fill out the questionnaire right away. By October 
2010, 26 participants had completed the survey in a suitable way. 25 respon-
dents completed all eleven conjoint tasks; one respondent missed one task, so 
that the final data set contains of 285 given answers. 
Table 5 summarises the answers of the first part of the interview given by 26 
respondents.   The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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Table 5:   Descriptive summary 
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100 ‐ 499 Million € 38.5%
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4.2 Conjoint  analysis 
Part 2 of the questionnaire consists of the actual conjoint analysis. Participants 
were asked to state their preference. Two investment projects were presented 
to them at a time and they had to state which investment they preferred. The 
answers to the conjoint tasks were used to assess the trade-off between risks 
and return facing investors. The utility model of Equation 2 was estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). The regression through the origin was performed 
on the stated conjoint answers. 
It was hereby assumed that the dependent variable is scaled at intervals. This 
means that the differences between all seven response options are regarded as 
being exactly the same. Dropping this assumption and applying an ordinal scale 
does not seem to change the result according to Green and Srinivasan (1978). 
It has to be mentioned, however, that the response options were narrowed. This 
limitation could not be avoided. 
It was furthermore ignored that one respondent had completed eleven tasks 
and that 26 respondents participated. The dataset was handled as though the 
answers were independent of each other. First, part-worth utilities and willing-
ness-to-accept values were computed for all the respondents. In a second step, 
the dataset was split up into debt investors and equity investors in order to ana-
lyse potential differences. The computed variance inflation factors (VIF) indi-
cated that the dummy variable trap was successfully avoided (Wooldridge 
2009)2. Table 6 displays the results of the model. 
The analysis shows that the utility model has an R-squared of 42.8% and an 
adjusted R-squared of 41.6%. Thus, less than half of the variation in the prefer-
ence statements can be explained by the five independent variables. This is 
comparable with the adjusted R-squared of a conjoint analysis conducted by 
Stärk et al. (2002). The F-test shows that the model is significant at the 99%-
level, but this is not surprising since there cannot be any variables other than 
the ones included to explain the dependent variable. All variables are highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level3. For an overview of the results per inves-
tor group see Annex. 
                                            
2   The VIF is a statistic to determine the severity of multicollinearity. 
3   Homoskedasticity justifies the usual F-tests and t-tests. The Breusch-Pagan test confirmed 
homoskedasticity.   The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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Table 6:   Regression results – all interviewees 
 
Source: Own calculation 
The part-worth utilities 
The variable ‘V.Prem.’ represents the part-worth value for moving from fixed 
remuneration towards a variable premium with cap and floor. The investment 
has higher risks as a result of this shift since price risk is imposed on the inves-
tor. The coefficient has the value -1.070. The sign is negative as expected, 
meaning that overall utility decreases by this value. 
The variable ‘Prem.’ represents the part-worth for moving from fixed remunera-
tion towards a premium model. This model imposes full price uncertainty on 
investors because remuneration is not limited by a cap or floor. The coefficient 
has the value -1.046, which is roughly as high as the coefficient for the variable 
‘V.Prem’, even though the premium model imposes a higher risk on investors. 
The variable ‘FLH’ measures the part-worth for increasing the annual full load 
hours by 200 full load hours, i.e. the profitability of the project increases. The 
coefficient has the value 0.618. The sign is positive, meaning that higher values 
of full load hours are preferred, which matches theory. 
The variable ‘Comp.’ represents the part-worth for receiving shut-down com-
pensation payments in the case of an enforced shut-down of the wind turbine 
due to potential grid instability. The coefficient has the value 0.458. The sign is 
positive as expected, since the compensation scheme guarantees that reve-
nues are independent of enforced shut-downs of the wind turbine. 
The last variable ‘Bal.’ measures the part-worth for participating in quantity bal-
ancing. This means that investors receive more remuneration per MWh in years 
with low wind yield and less remuneration per MWh in years with high wind 
Independent Variables Coefficient VIF
VPrem ‐1.070 ‐1.327 ‐0.813 1.439
Prem ‐1.046 ‐1.289 ‐0.803 1.463
FLH 0.618 0.490 0.747 1.026
Comp 0.458 0.282 0.634 1.055
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yield. The resulting revenue stream will therefore fluctuate less and uncertain-
ties about wind yield are compensated. The coefficient has the value 0.267. The 
sign is positive as expected. 
The last three part-worths increase the overall utility of the project while the first 
two part-worths decrease utility compared to the baseline investment (fixed feed 
in tariff, 1600 FLH, no compensation, no balancing).  
Willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results and to investigate the trade-off be-
tween risks and return, the investors’ willingness to accept certain risks (WTA) 
was calculated using Equation 4. Results are presented in Figure 3. The base 
investment option offers neither shut-down compensation nor quantity balanc-
ing, which are both favoured by investors. These part worth values conse-
quently yield a negative value, so that the results has to be interpreted as the 
willingness to pay (WTP) for receiving compensation and participating in quan-
tity balancing, while the ratios of the part-worths for premium or variable pre-
mium are positive, indicating the willingness to accept an increased risk (WTA). 
Figure 3:   WTA and WTP values 
 
Source: Own illustration.  
Note: the dark blue bars indicate the values of the 95% confidence interval. 
The analysis shows that an investment project with a variable premium has to 
offer 116 full load hours more on average than a fixed remuneration model – 
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an increase in power production of 7% compared to the base investment offer-
ing only 1600 full load hours. Applying the values of the 95% confidence inter-
val, the FLH range between 74 and 184 FLHs. 
The willingness to accept the premium model is similarly high (118 FLHs) with a 
range between 76 and 186 FLHs resulting in an increase of power generation 
by 7%. Limiting the price risk by setting a cap and a floor does not apparently 
have any smaller effect than the change to a premium scheme without cap and 
floor. 
Subsequently, changing from a fixed remuneration scheme with a guaranteed 
price for 20 years to one with a premium and, hence, fluctuating remuneration 
requires compensating the rising price risk by higher expected wind yields. 
Shut-down compensation protects investors against unexpected revenue de-
faults resulting from the enforced shut-downs of wind turbines in cases of poten-
tial grid instability. On average investors agree to waive 270 FLHs (with a range 
between 236 and 348 FLHs) in order to reduce performance. This is a decrease 
of 17% in power output in comparison to the investment offering 1600 FLHs. 
The last risk incorporated in the conjoint analysis is uncertainty about wind 
yield. This is addressed through quantity balancing. On average investors have 
a willingness-to-pay of about 463 FLHs (with a range between 338 and 1065 
FLHs) to shift this type of risk. This is equivalent to a decrease of 29% of power 
output. Currently, this policy element is not implemented, so the benefits of such 
an instrument may be unclear to investors. Johnson and Desvousges (1997) 
point out that respondents may pay only limited (if any) attention to unfamiliar 
attributes. 
4.3  Cash flow model 
The WTA and WTP represent key values for the traditional cash flow model, 
which assesses the impact of the analysed mechanism elements on financing 
costs. The FLH estimates are added to the base level of the attribute full load 
hours (1600) to obtain the overall FLHs the investor requires for the alternative. 
By inserting the figures in the cash flow model, the corresponding IRR values 
are computed. The difference between the IRR of the baseline investment and 
the respective alternatives (premium, compensation, balancing) shows the re-
quired increase in IRR to compensate for the changes (risks). Table 7 displays 
the results. The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment 
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Table 7:   Impact on IRR 
 
Source: Own calculation 
An investment with a variable premium (cap and floor) scheme has to offer 116 
additional full load hours in comparison to the base investment option making 
1716 FLHs in total. A wind power investment with this energy production has an 
IRR of 6.54% – ceteris paribus. This is 0.68 percentage points higher than the 
baseline investment with an IRR of 5.68%. Introducing a premium model 
causes a rise of 0.70 percentage points, slightly above the impact of a variable 
premium model. Changing the feed-in tariff therefore causes a rise in IRR of 
between 0.68 and 0.70 percentage points. 
Ragwitz et al. (2007) conducted a study on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
currently applied RES support measures in the European Union. In doing so 
they assumed that the premium model would raise financing costs by 1.05 per-
centage points compared to a fixed feed-in tariff. However, the specific design 
of the applied premium models is not completely comparable.  
As discussed above, the baseline investment option is riskier than the alterna-
tive investment with the fourth variable “Comp.” and the fifth variable “Bal.”. 
WTA is therefore negative and can be regarded as the willingness-to-pay 
(WTP). When offering shut-down compensation, the IRR decreases by 1.70 
percentage points and by about 3 points if the investor benefits from quantity 
balancing. 
The dataset was also divided into two subsets: debt investors (120 answers) 
and equity investors (165 answers). The same procedure in both groups has 
been applied. A Chow test was conducted to investigate whether a structural 
change exists. There is evidence that the coefficients of the two subsets do in-
deed differ (Greene 2008). Table 8 shows the impact on the IRR (for the 
WTP/WTA see Figure 4 in Annex). 
Variables WTA [FLHs] FLHs IRR Δ IRR
V.Prem. 116 1716 6.54% 0.68%
Prem. 118 1718 6.56% 0.70%
Comp. ‐270  1330 4.16% ‐1.70%
Bal. ‐463  1137 2.86% ‐3.00%  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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Table 8:   Impact on IRR of subsets 
 
Source: Own calculation 
Debt investors are known to be generally more risk averse. Therefore their re-
actions (WTA and WTP values) on changes (premium, compensation or balanc-
ing) are expected to be more significant. However, the results do not confirm 
this assumption; their WTA and WTP values are in general lower than those of 
equity investors. Theory states that debt investors are more interested in stable 
returns than in potentially high returns. Here we learn, that lenders seem to be 
willing to waive only a certain share of profitability in order to lower the riskiness 
of the project. But debt costs are generally fixed for a given period and already 
lower than equity costs. This might be a reason why the lenders’ reaction to ac-
cept lower risks and a lower IRR is moderate. The change in IRR can inter-
preted as a change in the interest rate which is offered to operators. Besides 
the focus on interest, from the lenders’ perspective other adaptations are also 
possible, e.g. higher equity shares or changes in the payback period, etc.  
From the equity investor’s perspective, the key decision variables are the cash 
flow and the expected return on equity. Since they provide capital that is subor-
dinated to loans, their share in the project is more at stake than debtors’ capital. 
Therefore, equity investors seem to be more concerned about risks and are will-
ing to accept a shift from a fixed tariff to a premium scheme only when profitabil-
ity clearly increases.  
Calculating the WACC4 reveals an additional financing cost between 70 and 88 
basis points (bp) for a variable premium or premium scheme.  
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5 Conclusion 
Countries all over the world have introduced various mechanisms to support 
renewable energies. Much research is being done to identify the risks which can 
potentially be addressed by such mechanisms. This work investigated three 
elements of feed-in scheme and analysed their influence on the riskiness of re-
newable energy projects. Conducting a conjoint analysis among 26 onshore 
wind power investors in Germany and subsequently applying a cash flow model 
allowed us to quantify the impact of various mechanisms on financing costs. 
We were able to show that changing a fixed feed-in tariff into a variable pre-
mium model with cap and floor seems to increase financing costs by 0.68 per-
centage points and by 0.70 points when turning it into a premium model. Inves-
tors tend to be not very willingly to trade price certainty against profitability. 
Langniß et al. (2009) proposed introducing a premium model instead of the 
fixed feed-in tariff currently applied in Germany to improve the integration of 
renewable energies into the power market. Shifting the tariff towards more mar-
ket-based instruments does not come without a cost however. Introducing pre-
mium models seems to raise financing costs, leading to potentially lower in-
stalled capacities – ceteris paribus. Statements from the interviewed wind 
power investors about the potential transition towards more market-based in-
struments support this hypothesis. While investors are well aware of the need to 
adjust the feed-in tariff, they are all concerned about financing. One stated: 
“May jeopardize bankability”, which is a felicitous description of the problem. 
The two other investigated elements were shut-down compensation and quan-
tity balancing. Incorporating a hardship scheme to compensate the operator for 
losses suffered due to enforced shutdowns as done in Germany in 2009 seems 
to reduce financing costs by 1.70 percentage points. This result might be inter-
esting for countries with grid problems to increase the attractiveness of invest-
ments. Offering quantity balancing to reduce fluctuations in revenue seems to 
decrease financing costs by 3 percentage points. This result suggests that it is 
worth discussing this element since the impact would be fairly large.  
This work investigated the quantitative influence on financing costs using a 
stated preference approach. Although there are arguments for and against the 
method employed here, it can still make a valuable contribution to the assess-
ment of different FIT policies.   The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
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Regression 5 451.9098017 90.38196034 41.82343222 4.63107E‐32
Residue 280 605.0901983 2.161036422
Gesamt 285 1057
Koeffizienten Standardfehler t‐Statistik P‐Wert Untere 95% Obere 95%
Schnittpunkt 0
VPrem ‐1.070012387 0.130733469 ‐8.184685965 9.70116E‐15 ‐1.327357617 ‐0.81266716
Prem ‐1.04606044 0.123587756 ‐8.464110661 1.46481E‐15 ‐1.289339531 ‐0.80278135
FLH 0.618339527 0.065366734 9.45954441 1.31859E‐18 0.489666912 0.74701214
Comp 0.458193913 0.089440683 5.122880298 5.61122E‐07 0.282132393 0.63425543
















Regression 5 178.5520958 35.71041916 16.52941375 3.0088E‐12
Residue 115 248.4479042 2.160416558
Gesamt 120 427
Koeffizienten Standardfehler t‐Statistik P‐Wert Untere 95% Obere 95%
Schnittpunkt 0
VPrem ‐1.088901709 0.201288753 ‐5.40965003 3.48339E‐07 ‐1.48761598 ‐0.69018744
Prem ‐1.403373622 0.190750011 ‐7.35713521 3.00815E‐11 ‐1.78121267 ‐1.02553457
FLH 0.392935703 0.100644376 3.904199286 0.000159859 0.19357857 0.59229284
Comp 0.496936162 0.137635956 3.610511225 0.000454089 0.22430583 0.76956649
Bal 0.353234793 0.13724891 2.57368014 0.011333366 0.08137113 0.62509846  The impact of policy elements on the financing costs of RE investment  
























Regression 5 313.1234497 62.62468994 31.62099051 2.8657E‐22
Residue 160 316.8765503 1.980478439
Gesamt 165 630
Koeffizienten Standardfehler t‐Statistik P‐Wert Untere 95% Obere 95%
Schnittpunkt 0
VPrem ‐1.057476614 0.164581814 ‐6.425233695 1.4398E‐09 ‐1.38250949 ‐0.73244374
Prem ‐0.786000456 0.155315832 ‐5.060658964 1.1359E‐06 ‐1.09273393 ‐0.47926698
FLH 0.784293863 0.082290907 9.530747603 2.47568E‐17 0.62177743 0.9468103
Comp 0.429048597 0.112641358 3.80897928 0.000198549 0.20659301 0.65150419
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